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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background to the study  
 
At the dawn of independence in Africa, colonial rulers hastily introduced new 
structures such as national parliaments, local councils, and opposition 
parties in a bid to channel popular demands into responsive policies. These 
structures while all laudable were no match for the ethnic identities that had 
been created during the colonial period. Colonial rulers had drawn ethnic 
and geographic boundaries arbitrarily perhaps as part of the divide and rule 
policy which are said to have contributed immensely to the development of 
ethnic identities.1 This seems to give credibility to Mngomezulu2 argument 
that the concept of ‘ethnicity’ itself was imposed by colonial administrators 
upon an otherwise undifferentiated group of people. Thus, while it may be 
true that Africans in the pre-colonial societies were not homogeneous as 
evidenced by the migration of various groups across the continent, the 
colonial era played on the divisions making them rigid.3  
 
These rigid ethnic identities, Taylor4 notes, have given rise to the politics of 
difference which is the cause of the many incidences of violence and 
conflict.5 Some of these conflicts have assumed a genocidal nature such as 
in Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia. At the heart of these conflicts is usually 
discontent among ethnic groups, due to deepening social injustice, the 
weakening administrative and policy apparatuses of the state among others.6 
Social groups thus still identify themselves with the lowest units of social 
and political organisation, namely ethnicity which has then been used as a 
                                                          
1    ED Green ‘On the size and shape of African states’ (2011) 3.  
2    BR Mngomezulu ‘Ethnic politics and life presidents as casual factors for the African  
     economic crisis’ (2008) 4. 
3    N Kasfir The shrinking political arena: Participation and ethnicity in African politics with a  
     case study of Uganda (1976)1. 
4    C Taylor Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition (1992)38. 
5    O Adebayo & L Laakso Challenges to the nation state in Africa (1996) 50. 
6    K Fulgencio ‘The politics of identity: Assessing the influence of ethnicity, regionalism,  
     religion and gender in Uganda’ (2009) 6. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
tool to exclude others.7 This has been done through the over centralisation of 
power leading to the manipulation by the dominant ethnic group of their 
position in power to siphon resources to their ethnic brothers. This 
evidenced in the distribution of resources, the polarisation of the army, civil 
service and executive, leaving the non-dominant ethnic groups feeling 
excluded. This exemplifies a need for a system of governance that would give 
the non-dominant ethnic groups an opportunity to manage their own affairs 
and curb control by the centre. To many scholars and researchers, the 
answer to this problem lies in the decentralisation of the government which 
is a means of integrating different interests into a national state while 
allowing a degree of independence to divergent groups. 
Decentralisation became more pronounced in the 1980s. It followed 
recommendations by the World Bank for developing countries to develop 
political and administrative powers to local and autonomous levels because 
most of the social services such as health, education, water and sanitation 
that were the responsibility of the central government, were failing.8 
Decentralisation also provides an institutional mechanism for bringing 
divided groups into formal rule-bound bargaining process and can serve as a 
path to national unity.9  
 
1.2. Statement of research problem 
 
Africa is a continent in crisis, a crisis which is multi-dimensional, has both 
economic and political manifestations coupled with deep seated historical 
roots.10 A multi-ethnic state is confronted with the complex problem of 
managing ethnic diversity. States may choose to manage diversity by 
suppressing ethnic minorities, creating an ethnically neutral state or to 
                                                          
7    J Bateisibwa Creating Ugandans in a new Uganda (2002) 13 cited in Fulgencio (n 6 above)  
     6. 
8    World Bank report 2003. 
9    RK Muriisa ‘Decentralisation in Uganda: Prospects for improved service delivery’ (2008)  
      XXXII Africa Development 83 84. 
10   M Abutundu ‘Reflections on early 21st century Africa’ in O Adesida & A Oteh (eds) African  
      voices, African visions (2001) 19.  
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separate state and ethnicity. This, however, serve as recipes for disaster as 
they fail to manage the ethnic question.11  
A multi-ethnic state like Uganda, which has been divided since colonialism, 
has faced grave challenges in managing ethnic diversity. The notions of 
cultural separatism and internal colonialism have become apparent in the 
government decisions on who to appoint to what position of authority, where 
resources should be utilised, among others. Thus, it is ethnic consciousness 
and not one’s ability or expertise that determines who is appointed to what 
position of authority. It is on this basis that the extreme violence has been 
carried out since independence.12 Fulgencio attributes this to the colonial 
divide and rule policy which bestowed on Buganda a privileged status in the 
1900 Uganda Agreement. He adds that the 1962 Independence Constitution 
reaffirmed Buganda’s superior position in the new state much to the chagrin 
of the rest of Uganda.13  
This ethnic divide was exacerbated by subsequent presidents and 
manifested in Uganda’s bloody history, the twenty year war in northern 
Uganda and the division between the Nilotic north and the Bantu dominated 
south.14 Ethnic tensions have also manifested in violent and angry protests 
in Kampala as people feel victimised by practices of the ruling government 
that seem to favour the president’s own relatively small ethnic.15 There are 
also arguments that the creation of new districts by government is merely a 
manipulation of ethnicity as they serve as inducement to communities to 
vote for the ruling political party.16  
                                                          
11   YT Fessha Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making In South Africa and  
      Ethiopia (2010) 23. 
12   JR Quinn ‘Ethnic conflict in Uganda’ (2004) 
      http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/faculty/quinn/ethnicconflictinuganda.pdf (accessed 30  
      August 2011). 
13   Fulgencio (n 6 above) 6. 
14   Fulgencio (n 6 above) 8. 
15   ‘Uganda in flames: Ethnicity as a mark for political dissent’ 
      http://africaworksgpz.com/2010/03/22/uganda-in-flames-ethnicity-as-masquerade-for-        
      political-resistance/(accessed 29 August 2011). 
16   Statistics show that the ruling party has taken the majority vote in all the new districts  
      created. 
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One would expect that the ambitious decentralisation reform initiated in 
Uganda would address these problems as it was a response to political and 
economic problems. This full-fledged devolution transferred political, 
administrative, financial and planning authority from central government to 
local government councils to promote popular participation, empower local 
people to make their own decisions and enhance accountability.17 However, 
the plan supposedly born during the guerrilla war of the ruling party does 
not seem to be achieving its results. The theory of decentralisation argues 
that decentralisation is not only about transfer of decision-making power 
and resources to lower level governments, but also authority to demand for 
accountability and enhancement of public participation in the local political 
process. This has not been done in Uganda as the system is still highly 
centralised. 18  
 
1.3. General objective of the study 
 
Uganda is one of the countries that has been practising decentralisation of 
government since the 1990s. However, this system does not seem to have 
achieved its objectives. Non-dominant ethnic groups in the country still feel 
excluded, leading to demands by some groups for a federal system of 
governance. It is, therefore, important to assess the decentralisation 
structures and policies to determine how and if they are managing ethnic 
diversity.   
The general objective of the study is to assess if a stronger system of 
decentralisation in Uganda can provide a mechanism by which ethnic 
differences can be accommodated. The study will also show that the ethnic 
question is grave concern in Uganda and investigate whether the existing 
decentralisation system has been effective in managing ethnic diversity in 
the country. 
 
                                                          
17   S Steiner ‘Decentralisation in Uganda: Exploring the constraints for poverty reduction’ in  
      G Crawford & C Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A pathway out of poverty and  
      conflict? (2008) 80.  
18   JM Kauzya ‘Political Decentralisation in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda and  
      South Africa’ (2007) 8. 
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1.4. Significance of the study 
 
Almost all countries in the world are ethnically plural and while diverse 
ethnic identities can sometimes flourish within a broadly defined national 
identity, at other times, these identities can be broadly denied in order to 
promote a particular definition of a nation.19 Some countries have forced a 
common language or culture on the people which has often resulted in 
violent reaction such as ethnic conflict and secessionism.20 Others like 
Colombia have pursued decentralisation as a means of addressing regional 
conflict or like Brazil decentralised to accommodate sharp regional 
differences. Decentralisation and regional autonomy measures have also 
figured prominently in debates about how to contain conflict in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bosnia, Colombia, Cyprus, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Sri Lanka.  
 
All these states have several challenges in trying to design how to achieve 
domestic peace. Policy makers in these states have turned to some form of 
decentralised governance as a possible means for managing conflicts 
between the central government and sub-national groups in pursuit of 
greater autonomy or outright independence.21 The World Bank has also 
noted that national unity is being sought through decentralisation in 
Uganda and South Africa.22 Thus in a bid to create amicable national 
situations and accommodate ethnic diversity, central governments all over 
the world are decentralising fiscal, political and administrative 
responsibilities to lower levels of government.23 In order to be effective, 
decentralisation requires innovative ways of structuring and 
institutionalising the interface between the people and their governments. 
                                                          
19   B Jacques Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia (2004) 214. 
20   D Brancati ‘Decentralisation: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict  
      and secessionism’ (2006) 60 International Organisation 651 651.   
21   KM Bakke & E Wibbles ‘Federalism and Intrastate Struggles: The Role of Diversity and  
      Disparity’ (2006) http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/copy /decentralization %20conference/Bak     
      ke%20 and% 20Wibbels.pdf (accessed 29 August 2011). 
22   BC Smith Good Governance and Development (2007) 103.  
23   JI Litvack et al Rethinking decentralisation in developing countries (1998) 1. 
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1.5. Literature review 
 
On the subject of decentralisation in Uganda, Dauda24 had explored the 
concept of democratic decentralisation as a means of ensuring 
accountability for existing resources, using Uganda and South Africa as 
examples. She argues that for decentralisation to be effective, practitioners 
must develop a better understanding of local political engagement so that 
their efforts may strengthen rather than thwart emerging political relations 
of accountability.  
Conyers25 has explored the history of decentralisation in Sub Saharan Africa 
noting the role that decentralisation has played in the continents history. 
She states that the impact of decentralisation on service delivery is indirect 
as it affects a number of immediate factors which include access to 
information, resources availability among others which in turn affect service 
delivery.  
Saxena26 has looked at the structure of the decentralised system of 
governance and has assessed decentralisation in Uganda in practise. While 
Schelnberger27 has explored the role of decentralisation in conflict 
management in Kibaale district in Uganda. She argues that decentralisation 
in Kibaale district is an example of how decentralisation polices can mitigate 
and intensify conflict. She traces the historical roots of the conflict on the 
district and comes to the conclusion that decentralisation and the increased 
participation of all groups of the population has actually contributed to 
conflict.  
                                                          
24    CL Dauda ‘Democracy and decentralisation: local politics, marginalisation and political  
      accountability in Uganda and South Africa’ (2006) 26 Public Administration and  
      Development 291 291. 
25   D Conyers ‘Decentralisation and service delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa’  
     (2007) 38 IDS Bulletin 18 18. 
26   K Saxena  ‘Decentralisation in Uganda’ (2010)  
http://www.ruralgovncaer.org/images/product/doc/13400450990decentralizationinUga
nda.pdf  (accessed October 19 2011).  
27   AK Schelnberger ‘ Decentralisation and conflict in Kibaale, Uganda’ in G Crawford & C  
     Hartmann (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A pathway out of poverty and conflict? (2008)  
     208. 
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Oloka28 in his paper on decentralisation and human rights conducted a 
critical audit to which the process of decentralisation has taken on board the 
issue of human rights. He states that decentralisation is under threat from 
the phenomenon of recentralisation witnessed by marked reversals in the 
policy of devolution and has left local governments with fewer resources. He 
goes ahead to propose recommendation to Uganda’s policy of 
decentralisation in order to ensure that human rights are respected at the 
local government level. 
There is a lot of separate information on the subjects of decentralisation and 
ethnicity, research shows that there is limited literature on the subject of 
decentralisation and the ethnicity in Uganda. Thus, having looked at what 
other people have written, I have a contribution to make on the subject.   
 
1.6. Research methodology 
 
The study will be qualitative and will follow a case study design. The 
research will be based on a textual analysis of available literature, a 
historical contextualisation of the concept of decentralisation and ethnicity. 
The research will be based on traditional library bases and on documented 
facts and will be theoretically informed by several related literature. The 
study will take an exploratory design.   
 
 
1.7. Limitations of the study 
 
There are several divisions that plague Uganda such as religion. However 
this thesis will only address ethnicity. There are also various methods of 
managing diversity that could be suggested such as the much sought after 
federalism, however, this study will be limited to decentralisation. The 
author will also be limited by the inability to carry out interviews and thus 
the information relied on will mostly be secondary information as obtained 
by the researcher.  
                                                          
28   J Oloka Onyango ‘Decentralisation without human rights? Local governance and access to  
      justice   in post movement Uganda’ (2007) 8. 
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1.8. Overview of chapters 
 
The study will consist of five chapters. Chapter one will be the introduction. 
In chapter two, I will look at the theory and practise of decentralisation and 
ethnic accommodation. Chapter three will then focus on ethnicity in 
Uganda. Chapter four will look at Uganda, decentralisation and the ethnic 
problem. In chapter five, i conclude and give recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DECENTRALISATION AND ETHNIC 
ACCOMMODATION 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores in theory whether ethnic accommodation can be 
achieved through decentralisation. It will be shown that even though some 
scholars argue that decentralisation does not accommodate ethnic diversity, 
it has been sought and achieved in a number of countries. It will be argued 
that using a good institutional design which includes elements such as 
territorial autonomy, representation, a clear demarcation of power, and 
strong fiscal decentralisation, this would ensure participation and autonomy 
of all ethnic groups thus accommodating ethnic diversity.  
2.2. Ethnicity 
 
An ethnic group is a psychological community whose members share a 
persisting sense of common interest and identity based on some 
combination of shared valued cultural traits. Its members distinguish 
themselves from other groups by such characteristics as language, social 
customs, and physical appearance and region of residence or by a 
combination of these features.29 Ethnic groups are thus social formations 
distinguished by communal character of their boundaries. 
 
Narrol an anthropologist has defined ethnicity to designate a population 
which is largely biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural 
values, realised in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of 
communication and interaction, has a membership which identifies itself 
and is identified by other categories to the same order.30 Ethnicity denotes 
the complexity of human existence and behaviour which defies simplistic 
definitions. It signifies perceptions of common origins, historical memories, 
ties of people. It has its foundation in combined remembrances of past 
experiences and in common aspirations, values, norms and expectations.31 
                                                          
29   JM Thompson Justice and peace: A christian primer (1997) 115. 
30   R Narrol ‘On Ethnic Unit classification’ (1964) 5 Current anthropology 283. 
31   SY Hameso Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a positive approach (1997) 9. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
2.2.1. The political relevance of ethnicity  
 
As most states in the world are ethnically plural, most conflicts in the world 
are no more between states but within states and as most of the latter entail 
a significant ethnic dimension.32 Many ethnically plural states have either 
chosen to embrace ethnic diversity and choose to coexist.33 Others have 
chosen to ignore ethnicity and develop a national identity in a bid to create 
the nation state and create a single national identity. At the centre of 
creating the nation state or nation building is the policy that promotes unity 
at the expense of ethnic diversity. This nation building processes 
inescapably privileges members of the majority culture leaving the minority 
cultures with limited options. These groups face marginalisation from 
economic, academic and political institutions of the society.34 Kymlicak 
points out two forms of nation building; one where the state nation building 
is based on the colonial language and pan-ethnic symbols that are neutral 
amongst various ethnic groups. Here, minorities mobilise as communal 
contenders to ensure that they are not excluded from a share of state power. 
The second is in countries such as Ethiopia, where the state nation building 
is not neutral amongst ethnic groups but is shaped by the dominant ethnic 
group to reflect its language, history and culture.35  
 
There are two schools of thought that explain the phenomenon of ethnic 
identity. The first is primordialism which explains ethnicity in terms of 
inherited group behavioural characteristics argued to be biologically based, 
that is ethnic groups identify passed on from one generation to the next. 
Primodialists entertain the notion that the dissolution of the one party state 
will naturally lead to multi-ethnic multi-partyism and through this a 
blossoming of ethnicity generally.36 The other school known as 
                                                          
32  JP Tranchant ‘Does fiscal decentralisation dampen ethnic conflicts? The heterogeneous  
     impact of fiscal decentralisation on local minorities and local majorities’ (2010) 2. 
33  Fessha (n 11 above) 10. 
34  W Kymlicka ‘Nation building & minority groups: Comparing Africa and the West in B  
     Berman et al  (eds) Ethnicity and democracy in Africa (2004) 56. 
35  As above 67. 
36  M Doornbos ‘ Linking the future to the past- ethnicity and pluralism’ in MA Mohamed &  
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instrumentalism argues that ethnicity is contextual, fluid and a function of 
structural conditions in society. Instrumentalists assert that ethnic 
identities are malleable, that they wax and wane, contingent on a number of 
variables including the capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can 
effectively mobilise groups for collective aims and articulate beliefs about 
common ancestry and destiny.37 They dismiss ethnicity as just an instance 
of false consciousness, positing that manifestations of ethnic identity, ethnic 
ideology and ethnic conflict are mere epiphenomena not really worthy of 
serious attention.38  
Despite these arguments, it can be seen that ethnicity as a form of identity 
only becomes relevant when people feel excluded and as a means of 
managing this, states have adopt a means that manages the ethnic divisions 
in a country. The primodialist school of thought seems to give credence to 
the view that ethnic identity is not a fixed unchangeable characteristic since 
the elements that define the ethic group have strong subjective components 
thus making it possible to change the content of one’s ethnic identity.39 
Ethnic identities can be shaped by social, economic and political processes. 
That especially happens in the context of state policies and state action, 
inter group rivalry and state resource competition. Ethnic consciousness is a 
frequent result of oppression by the state or the majority community then 
ethnic identity is mobilised by political agents to demand greater 
concessions and share in power and authority.40 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
      SJ Markakis (eds) Ethnicity and the state in Eastern Africa (1998) 20.  
37   SO Ouma  ‘Constitutional mechanisms for the management and settlement of identity  
      conflicts: The case of Sudan, Kenya and Somalia’ Unpublished PhD Thesis, Luiss  
      University of Rome (2011) 273. 
38   Doornbos ‘Linking the future to the past- ethnicity and pluralism’ in MA Mohamed & SJ  
      Markakis (n 36 above) 20. 
39   YT Fessha ‘Institutional Recognition and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism  
      in South Africa and Ethiopia’ Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape  
      (2008) 26. 
40   As above 27. 
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2.3.  Decentralisation  
2.3.1. Definition of decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation is taken to mean a transfer of power away from a central 
authority to a lower level in territorial hierarchy.41 Decentralisation is a 
means of overcoming the limitations of centrally controlled national planning 
by delegating greater authority to officials working in the field, closer to the 
problems. It may result in better penetration of national policies to remote 
local communities, greater representation for various religious, ethnic and 
tribal groups in the policy process, and greater administrative capability at 
the local level.42 In the most general of terms, decentralisation refers to the 
transfer of authority from a central government to a sub-national entity.43 It 
is important to note that under the decentralised system of governance, the 
central government retains decision making powers as to the functions and 
responsibilities of the local government meaning that the central government 
can recentralise powers and functions that it has already decentralised.44 
 
2.3.2  Autonomous arrangements 
 
Autonomy in the decentralised system is a critical principle that must 
underpin the decentralisation effort. If the local government does not have 
sufficient and real power, it cannot enlarge people’s choice by being 
responsive to their needs.45 Jellinek46 has described an autonomous entity 
as one based solely on its own laws and with all the material and functional 
attributes of statehood. In this study, autonomy refers to an arrangement 
aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population 
                                                          
41   RC Cook & J Manor Democracy and decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa;  
      participation, accountability and performance (1998) 6.  
42   MS de Vires ‘The rise and fall of decentralisation: A comparative analysis of arguments  
      and practices in European countries’ (2000) 38 European Journal of Political Research 193  
      197. 
43   S Boko Decentralisation and reform in Africa (2002) 19. 
44   Fessha (n 39 above) 90. 
45   J de Visser Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa (2005) 35. 
46   G Jellinek The general theory of the state (1960) 493. 
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in the state but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by 
which it can express its distinct identity.  
 
2.3.3. Forms of decentralisation  
Deconcentration  
 
This is the delegation of certain decision making powers to lower, provincial 
or local levels of the central government.47 It has a peculiar characteristic in 
that it is a form of centralisation and decentralisation. In this case, decision 
making authority is shifted from one locality and one individual to lower 
levels of the government.48 However, although financial and management 
responsibility may be shifted to the local units, there remains the 
hierarchical dependence of the local authority on the central government for 
appointments, assignments and salaries.49 Deconcentration is the weakest 
form of decentralisation used mostly in unitary states.  
 
Delegation 
 
With delegation, the responsibility for decision making with respect to public 
functions and administration is transferred to the semi-autonomous 
organisations or units that are not wholly under the control of government.50 
Such organisations as housing or transportation authorities, public 
enterprises, regional development corporations may enjoy ample discretion 
in decision making and may not be subject to the same constraints as 
regular service personnel.51 Delegation remains a limited form of 
decentralisation with the difference between it and full political 
decentralisation being that the lower level organisations to which power is 
transferred remain ultimately accountable to the central government.  
 
                                                          
47   Boko (n 43 above).  
48   As above. 
49   Cook & Manor (n 41 above) 11- 12.  
50   W Oyugi ‘Decentralisation for good governance and development’ (2000) 21 Regional  
      Development Dialogue 3. 
51   As above. 
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Devolution  
 
This is a form of decentralisation in which the authority for decision making 
with respect to finance and management is transferred to quasi-autonomous 
units of local government.52 In other words, devolution is a political concept 
that denotes the transfer of political, administrative and legal authority from 
the centre to lower level units of government created by the national 
constitution. In a devolved political system, the lower level units of 
government to which power, authority and responsibility have been 
transferred are more or less autonomous from each other.53 Devolution 
forms the foundation for political decentralisation in that it usually involves 
the transfer of responsibilities to municipalities that elect their own mayors 
and councils, raise their own revenues and are able to make investment 
decisions independently of the central government. In such a system, local 
governments have legally recognised geographical boundaries within which 
they exercise their authority and perform public functions.  
 
2.3.4. Content of decentralisation   
Administrative decentralisation  
 
This is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and 
management of selected public functions from the central government to 
lower tier units of the government.54 These might be field units of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations or regional 
authorities. It complements political autonomy by freeing sub-national units 
from reliance on the central government and its bureaucracy to implement 
their local policy decisions.55  
 
                                                          
52   JC Ribot ‘African decentralisation: Local actors, powers and accountability, democracy,  
      governance and human rights’ (2002) 7. 
53   As above. 
54   JM Cohen & SB Peterson ‘Administrative decentralisation: A new framework for improved  
    governance, accountability and performance http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf.  
    (accessed 29 September 2011). 
55   Y Fessha & C Kirkby ‘A critical survey of sub-national autonomy in African states’ (2008)  
      38 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 248 259.  
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Political decentralisation  
 
It consists of the creation of sub-national levels of government with 
hierarchical division of power where each level has independent decision 
making power at least one issue area.56 Generally, political devolution is 
more likely to be successful when conducted within the framework of a 
multiparty, participatory, grassroots-based system.57 The exercise of the 
delegated tasks by the lower authority remains under the legal direction and 
control of the central authority. The responsibility for implementation 
remains with the centre and the lower authorities are only mandated to 
execute and the directives of the higher authority. The unitary state provides 
either asymmetric or general autonomy to its regions.58 Political 
decentralisation is best conceived when it includes the full range transfer of 
decision-making from central government to local governments.59 
 
Fiscal decentralisation  
 
This refers to the definition and alignment of monetary functions among the 
different levels of government.60 The responsibility of which level of 
government sets and collects taxes or which tier undertakes what 
expenditures ought to be clearly spelt out. Fiscal decentralisation if not 
clearly structured may altogether derail an otherwise plausible 
decentralisation program. It must clearly specify what types and what levels 
of intergovernmental transfers are undertaken, whether municipalities or 
counties as the case may be can expand local revenues through property 
taxes, sales taxes or indirect taxes. It must also spell out whether there is to 
be any type of co-financing arrangements between the central government 
                                                          
56   Brancati (n 20 above) 6. 
57   S Yuichi ‘The effect of decentralisation on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2008) 47. 
58   T Fleiner & LRB Fleiner Constitutional democracy in a multicultural and globalised world  
      (2009) 539. 
59   Kauzya (n 18 above) 4. 
60   P Smoke ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A review of current concepts  
     and practice‘ (2001) 9. 
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and local government and whether municipalities have the authority to 
borrow and mobilise funds from local, national or international sources.61  
 
2.4. Decentralisation and ethnicity  
 
In many circumstances, countries decide to decentralise not as a means of 
accommodating ethnic diversity, but as already stated, to manage resources 
better or to bring services closer to the people. However, given the ethnic 
conflict and political, economic challenges in ethnically diverse states, 
scholars have sought to look for other means of reducing ethnic conflict in 
ethnically plural states. Several tools have been suggested such as 
federalism and consociationalism. One of these tools is decentralisation 
which is thought to manage ethnic diversity as ethnic groups have control 
over political, administrative and fiscal matters.  
 
This chapter argues that under the right circumstances, decentralisation 
can bring excluded ethnic groups closer to the government and provide them 
with a tool to address their grievances.62 Decentralisation allows for ethnic 
minorities to control their own affairs whilst the geographical integrity of the 
country remains intact.  Decentralisation improves the quality of 
governance, fosters political participation and helps designing and 
implementing policies that are closer to the people in the field of 
development.63 
 
In practise however, there have been divergent views on the ability of 
decentralisation to manage ethnic diversity as it has been more successful in 
some states over other states.  For example, while decentralisation has been 
successful in Quebec and Spain, it was less successful in Czechoslovakia 
which dissolved into two separate states in 1993.64 Trenchant argues that 
even though decentralisation exerts a strong effect on ethnic violence, it all 
depends on the distribution of ethnic groups within the country and the 
                                                          
61   Ouma (n 37 above) 30. 
62   D Brancati Peace by design; Managing intrastate conflict through decentralisation (2009) 3. 
63   Trenchant (n 32 above) 2. 
64   As above 3. 
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distribution of demographic characteristics of these groups which can make 
the overall effect of decentralisation be null, negative or positive.65 Others 
argue that decentralisation continues to freeze ethnic identities over time, 
reinforce the legitimacy of ethnically defined subunits and to provide new 
institutional and economic resources to the separatist movement.66 This 
would thus fostering violent conflict instead of preventing them. 
Former Canadian prime minister has heralded decentralisation as the best 
way to integrate diverse groups within a large country.67  And  given the 
excesses to which intra state ethnic conflict can go as was witnessed in 
Rwanda in 1994, a solution  has to be found to manage these diverse states, 
decentralisation despite its short falls would be one of these solutions.  
2.4.1. Administrative decentralisation 
Territorial autonomy 
As Trenchant argues, small groups, concentrated in one region in which they 
represent a significant share of the population are good candidates to benefit 
from territorial decentralisation.68 Through this form of decentralisation, the 
political and spatial realities on the ground would be recognised by granting 
each group a state-within-a-state. This would mitigate fears of political 
exploitation and, at least in part, satisfy local demands for autonomy. Here, 
decentralisation increases the well-being of minority groups if it empowers 
them enough so that they can design and implement public policies close to 
their preferences.69  
 
The importance of a good territorial design was witnessed in 2007 post 
election violence in Kenya where regions were associated with ethnic conflict. 
Mugoya70 noted that the grouping of ethnic groups into regions where they 
formed the majority may have in the long-run led inter-ethnic competition 
                                                          
65   As above 3. 
66   Kymlicka (n 43 above) 54. 
67   Brancati (n 62 above) 4. 
68   Trenchant (n 32 above) 2. 
69   DA Lake & D Rothchild ‘Territorial decentralisation and civil war settlements’ (2005) 2. 
70   BC Mugoya ‘Devolution and conflict resolution: Assessing the potential role and capacity  
      of county governments in enhancing local peace in Kenya’ (2011) 8. 
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which led to negative ethnic consciousness and thus ethnic conflict. In such 
circumstances, some scholars urge splitting of ethnic groups in order to 
create intra-ethnic competition as a means of reducing ethnic conflict.71 The 
new Kenyan Constitution may have followed this by dividing most of the 
major ethnic groups in Kenya into several county governments. 
Nigeria also redrew its boundaries to accommodate its ethnic diversity. This 
occurred when rising ethnic tensions and regional antagonisms within the 
new Nigerian state necessitated the progressive decentralisation of the polity, 
leading ultimately in 1954 to the establishment of a three region federation 
which survived until independence in 1960.72 The three region tier however 
failed to secure Nigeria’s unity and diversity due to fundamental structural 
flaws in the design. These flaws included the division into only three or four 
large regions which robbed the political system of its flexibility that could 
have resulted from a larger number of smaller constituent units which 
denied smaller units to ethnic minorities. Thus in 1967, the military 
government in a bid to stave off imminent secession proclaimed the 
dissolution of the four regions into twelve states which contributed to 
diluting the hegemony of the north, curtail the chauvinism and secessionism 
of the three major groups, alleviate ethnic minority insecurity.73 
It is important to note that while creating ethnically homogenous units can 
only solve ethnic diversity to a certain degree, a state can never have a truly 
ethnically homogenous unit as there will always be a minority within those 
units. In such situations, the states should put in place mechanisms that 
should protect the minorities that would be living in these units. It is also 
important to note that territorial autonomy is always secondary to political 
decentralisation as the redrawing of boundaries alone cannot calm ethnic 
tensions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
71   Fessha (n 39 above) 416-425. 
72   R Suberu ‘Federalism and the management of ethnic conflict: the Nigerian experience’  
      (1996) 68. 
73   As above 70.  
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2.4.2. Political decentralisation 
 
There are two important basic designs for local governments that would 
make for strong political decentralisation. The first is the ability of ethnic 
minorities to elect their leaders democratically and secondly, the separation 
of powers that the central government and the local government have.74 The 
institutional framework must allocate powers to Local governments in this 
respect have to have final decision making power over certain areas of 
governance. The local government should not be undermined or limited by 
another central or regional authority except as provided by law. Ethnic 
minorities need to have authority over the elections through direct elections 
as the highest form of control which ensures better responsiveness of the 
local government and of higher accountability. 
 
The primary concern of political decentralisation therefore is creating a 
conducive political environment for decentralised decision making. The 
essential components of such an environment are autonomous decision 
making powers of lower levels of government and citizens’ access to decision 
making. In parallel, it is necessary to strengthen autonomous local entities. 
To prevent different tiers of government from working at cross-purposes, the 
national Constitution should provide the framework within which local 
governments are to function.75 A good example of this is in South Africa 
where the Constitution mandates local governments to provide democratic 
and accountable government for local communities and provides for elected 
provinces and municipalities.76  
 
2.4.3. Fiscal decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation is an important part in managing ethnic diversity 
because political or administrative power without control over resources 
might be meaningless.77 The distribution of spending and regulatory powers 
between levels of government is usually regarded, and rightly so, as the 
                                                          
74   Fessha & Kirkby (n 55 above) 256. 
75   De Visser (n 45 above) 41. 
76   Fessha & Kirkby (n 55 above) 256. 
77   Jacques (n 19 above) 187. 
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keystone of decentralisation.78 Fiscal decentralisation is advocated for on the 
grounds that the central government cannot adequately meet the growing 
local demands for adequate goods and services as it fails to improve fiscal 
efficiency as it fails to take into account cultural differences as well as 
economic and social factors among others which are all important factors of 
public sector performance.79 
A key issue in the process of good decentralisation is to find an appropriate 
financing system for local governments. Local governments must have 
adequate revenue to fund their public expenditure requirements so that they 
enjoy effective autonomy but at the same time they must take responsibility 
for how they raise those revenues. However, the central government must 
also ensure equality between citizens within all the regions whether the 
region is poor or rich. Thus as Bosch argues, autonomy and fiscal wellbeing 
must be combined with territorial solidarity.80 Effective fiscal 
decentralisation requires meaningful levels of revenue autonomy at the 
regional and local government levels what is also needed is accountability 
and political and fiscal responsibility for sub national government officials 
which is fundamentally achieved by granting sub national governments a 
significant level of tax autonomy.81 
South Africa’s local government revenue comprises of own revenue, inter 
governmental allocations and borrowing.82 Local governments are 
responsible for the provision of public goods and user services. The public 
goods comprise municipal infrastructure like access roads, streets, 
streetlights, garbage collection, sanitation, and town planning. The key users 
pay services are water and electricity. Local governments also have taxation 
powers (property rates, regional levies), and generate income from the 
                                                          
78   N Bosch Revenue assignments in fiscal decentralisation in N Bosch & JM Duran Fiscal  
      federalism and political decentralisation: lessons from Spain, Germany and Canada  
      (2008) 50. 
79   F Kiichiro & DM Luiz (eds) Development Centre Seminars Fiscal Decentralisation in  
      Emerging Economies  9. 
80   Bosch & Duran (n 78 above) ix. 
81   As above 49. 
82   J de Visser ‘Republic of South Africa’ in N Steytler (ed) Local government and metropolitan  
      regions in federal countries (2009) 281.  
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provision of services. The South African Constitution allows provincial and 
local governments to borrow for capital and bridging purposes only.83 
 
Colombia has a fairly successful system of fiscal decentralisation. The 
central government’s budget is shared with the local and regional 
governments which receive transfers and shared revenue amounting to 
almost fifty percent of the total budget. The transfers are both conditional 
and unconditional. The revenues are based upon the size of the population, 
the degree of poverty and demand for example regarding school needs. 
Although, the fiscal and political decentralisation was not successful in 
solving the long lasting security conflict at the sub-national level,84 it is 
regarded as rather successful with regard to the effectiveness of transfers 
and financial management at central government level.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, as many countries in the world are not ethnically 
homogenous, the in ability of governments to manage ethnic diversity in 
their countries has on many occasions led to ethnic conflict, threats of 
secession and discontent. However, a carefully crafted design of 
decentralisation that is well implemented may lead to ethnic 
accommodation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83  I Momoniat ‘Fiscal decentralisation in South Africa a practitioners perspective’ (2004) 9. 
84  N Boschmann ‘Fiscal decentralisation and options for donor harmonisation’ (2009) 25. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ETHNICITY IN UGANDA 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter will address the evolution of ethnicity in Uganda. It will explore 
long term route of ethnicity by examining the origins, route and 
concretisation of the ethnic divisions in Uganda. The examination starts 
from colonialism when ethnic divisions are said to have been born through 
the colonial policies of divide and rule, drawing of colonial boundaries, 
economic and labour divisions as well as the special status given to 
Buganda. It will be argued that that those who governed post colonial 
Uganda, from Mutesa to Museveni, played an important role in the 
entrenchment of these ethnic divisions. The discussion of Museveni’s era 
which spans over 26 years will be divided into two eras from 1986 to 1995, 
showing how he tried to accommodate ethnicity, and from 1995 to date, 
addressing his inability to manage diversity by looking at the army, the war 
in northern Uganda, the executive and the creation of new districts.  
With a population of more than 31 million people, the Constitution 
recognises 65 ethnic groups.85 The Baganda form the largest group, 
comprising almost 17% followed by Ankole (8%), Iteso (8%), Basoga (8%), 
Bakiga 7%, Banyarwanda (6%), Langi (6%), Bagisu (5%), Acholi (4%), and 
Lugbara (4%).86 These ethnic groups are subsumed into larger categories as 
the Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamatic and Sudanic people.  With the two main 
clusters of the Bantu and the Nilotic situated in the southern and northern 
parts of Uganda respectively.  
 
3.2. Ethnicity during the Colonial era 
 
In the 68 years of colonial administration, the British systematically 
cultivated and firmly established an intricate system of domination in all 
                                                          
85   Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995. 
86   CIA fact sheet https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ug.ht ml   
     (accessed 13 September 2011). 
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spheres of Uganda society.87  This started with the 1900 Buganda agreement 
and the subsequent agreements which were signed by other kingdom areas 
such as Ankole, Toro and later Bunyoro defined the nature of association in 
the colony. Through these agreements, the colonialists worked out a politico-
economic formula for Buganda and other kingdom areas but one which was 
different from the northern regions and was the beginning of the ethnic woes 
and the colonial policy of divide and rule.  
 
3.2.1. Divide and rule  
 
This policy started with the way in which the term 'tribe' was deployed by 
the British colonial administration as a policy for colonising and 
administering Uganda.88 The 'tribe' was used as a tool of mapping and 
controlling the population for exploitation and domination. It was so intense 
that it was socialised in the consciousness of the Ugandan political elite who 
later became the rulers of post-colonial states.89 This policy was designed to 
reduce social interaction and promoted disunity and ethnicity.90 It was 
justified mainly by the argument that it would be cheaper to permit 
traditional authorities to carry out administrative tasks under British 
supervision.91   
 
The policy pitted some ethnic groups against others for colonial advantage. 
For example, to curb resistance against their rule, the British collaborated 
with the Baganda and used them as agents in their military campaigns to 
conquer areas such as Bunyoro kingdom where king Kabalega attempted to 
resist British colonialism. When the Banyoro were eventually defeated, the 
British rewarded the Baganda by giving them land in Bunyoro.92 Buganda’s 
                                                          
87   JA Okuku Ethnicity, state power and the democratization process in Uganda (2002) 6.  
88   DW Nabudere ‘Ethnicity and conflict in Uganda is national consensus possible’  
      http://allafrica.com/stories/20090921758.html(accessed 10 September 2011). 
89   As above. 
90   TB Kabwegere The politics of state formation: The nature and effects of colonialism in  
      Uganda (1977) 44. 
91   Kasfir (n 3 above) 97.  
92   They are referred to as the ‘lost counties’ and were a great contribution to the 1966  
      Buganda.  
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direct collaboration with the British imperialists thus aggravated the ancient 
rivalry between the two kingdoms, a matter that was compounded by the 
annexation to Buganda of two Bunyoro counties as war booty.93 This 
involved uprooting hundreds and thousands of Banyoro who lost their 
ancestral land.  
The colonialists also used Baganda to conquer and implement the harsh and 
oppressive rules in the Northern and Eastern parts. In these areas the 
Baganda were appointed as chiefs to the other colonised ethnic groups.94 By 
using Baganda agents and giving Buganda a degree of self government, 
denied to other kingdoms and districts, the British contributed to a sense of 
resentment other people felt towards the Baganda. There was also a growing 
awareness that only by unity approximating that of the Baganda could other 
ethnic groups wring similar concessions from the British.95  
 
3.2.2. Drawing of colonial boundaries 
 
When the British created Uganda, they lumped together members of diverse 
ethnic groups with different backgrounds, political systems, cultures and 
traditions.96 However, despite this, the British drew ethnically inspired 
boundary lines in addition to the divide and rule policy. The country was 
carved into administrative units, the most significant of which was the 
district. With a few exceptions, the boundaries of these districts coincided 
with more or less culturally homogenous groups.97 In these districts, 
counties were often demarcated along ethnic lines and given the name that 
the people called themselves. These ethnic boundaries were frozen to better 
maintain law and order or changed to reward one ethnic group at the 
expense of another. It created problems later in areas like eastern and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
      crisis. This problem has not been resolved and Buhekura, Buruli, Bulemezi and parts of  
      Singo which were part of Bunyoro and Mawogola and Kabula which were part of Ankole  
      remain part of Buganda to date.  
93   F Byarugaba ‘Ethno politics and the state: Lessons from Uganda’ In M Salih & J Markakis  
      (eds) Ethnicity and the state in Eastern Africa (1998) 183. 
94   JO Latigo ‘Northern Uganda: Tradition based practices in the Acholi region’ (2008) 86. 
95   Kasfir (n 3 above) 99. 
96   G Mwakikagile Ethnicity and national identity in Uganda (2009) 15.  
97   DM Mudoola Religion, ethnicity and politics in Uganda (1996) 11.  
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western Uganda where ethnic tensions culminated guerrilla movements. 
These movements were peasant resistance against the intense oppression 
that led to land deprivation, language exclusion, and job discrimination 
throughout most of the colonial period.98  
 
This version of indirect rule contributed to the growth of ethnic identification 
but more importantly, it sanctioned the notion that the existence of an 
ethnic unit was a valid basis for an administrative unit.99 The districts 
demarcated by the colonial administrators still hold today and ethnic groups 
still regard themselves as unique entities although they accept rule from the 
centre.  
 
3.2.3. Economics and Labour 
 
The undemocratic and autocratic nature of the British colonial rule also 
resulted in the economic exclusion of the colonised which enhanced ethnic 
consciousness and was compounded by economic distortions.100 British 
colonialism created regional imbalances and ethnic specialisation as 
southern and to some extent eastern Uganda became regions of peasant 
production of cotton and coffee.101 While labourers from the north and south 
western was created to offer labour to peasant farmers in the south for cash 
crop production. This explains the unbalanced development in Uganda.102 
The British did very little to encourage cash crop production in the north 
even if cotton could grow well enough there. Active measures were taken to 
discourage this. Without the necessary transportation infrastructure, the 
growing of cash crops in Northern Uganda  would have been meaningless in 
economic terms since the cost of getting such crops to Kampala and the to 
the coast in Mombasa would have been prohibitive.  
                                                          
98   M Mamdani Citizen and its subjects (1994) 197. 
99   Kasfir (n 3 above) 99. 
100  Okuku (n 87 above) 92. 
101  SR Karugire Roots of political stability in Uganda (1988) 33.  
102  FR Banugire ‘Uneven and unbalanced development: Development strategies and conflict’  
      in K Rupensinghe (ed) Conflict resolution in Uganda (1989) 208. 
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The perfect solution of the British was to involve them in the Army. Thus 
Acholi, Teso and West Nile became catchment areas for armed forces.103 The 
southerners would grow cash crops and their educated sections would 
become minor civil servants while the less educated northerners would serve 
in the army, police, and prisons and provide labour in the southern factories 
and plantations. It became a truism that a solider must be a northerner and 
a civil servant a southerner. The implications of this division of labour were 
only realised in the post-colonial period.  
Baganda were also granted a superior status above others. The Baganda 
consolidated their population advantage by becoming educational and 
economic elite. The Baganda continued all throughout the colonial period to 
get the higher paying jobs because they were better educated by colonial 
standards. Their numbers dominated the rapidly expanding civil service, and 
virtually monopolised its higher level positions as they were opened up to 
Africans.104 By the late 1950s as Uganda moved towards independence, 
many of the contradictions of colonial rule became obvious. Most important 
was the extremely privileged position of Buganda and to a lesser degree of 
the south in general as opposed to the north.105 
 
3.2.4. Buganda’s special status  
 
Although all the above factors in a way point to Buganda’s privileged status 
over the rest of the country, an important part of the ethnic divide created by 
colonialism was the kingdom of Buganda. Buganda was the focus of 
merchant missionary and other colonial activities and many Baganda allied 
themselves with the powerful new outsiders.106 Buganda became the 
commercial and administrative centre of the colony. Roads, schools and 
other infrastructural investments were concentrated there. Atkinson states 
that it was because the British felt that the set up of Buganda was most 
similar to their own and thus worthy of some respect and recognition and 
                                                          
103   J Mugaju Uganda’s age of reform: A critical overview (1999) 14.  
104   RR Atkinson The roots of ethnicity; the origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800 (1994)    
       8. 
105   As above. 
106   As above 3. 
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that in this context, both the Baganda and British elite emphasised, 
exaggerated and sometime invented ethnic distinction.107 
Further, the 1900 agreement gave Buganda a lot of advantages. It defined 
Buganda as part of Uganda, spelt out the powers of the Kabaka and his 
chiefs and the material interests of the chiefs. This would continue as long 
as the Kabaka, his chiefs and conformed to the laws and regulations 
instituted by the British, the British would recognise Buganda kingdom. 
However when it came to the other Kingdoms of Toro and Ankole in 1901 
and Bunyoro in 1933, the agreements were limited to definition of 
administrative areas eventually known as districts and no formal 
agreements were made apart from ordinances defining the powers and 
obligations of the chiefs.108 
 
The 1962 independence Constitution reaffirmed Buganda superior position 
in the new state to the chagrin of the rest of Uganda. Buganda was given a 
federal status while the other kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro and Busoga were 
granted a semi federal status. The rest of the country was to be governed 
from the centre and was placed under a unitary system.109 This arrangement 
as well as the Kabaka of Buganda being president did not sit well with many 
and it was a source of controversy and instability.110 From then on, the 
relationship between Buganda Kingdom and the national political leaders 
has been one characterised by Buganda’s demands for a privileged status 
over and above that of other areas.111  
This manoeuver by the British was seen by the nationalist politicians of the 
time, especially in the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and to some extent in 
the Democratic Party (DP) as a British colonial attempt to 'divide and rule' by 
'favouring' the Buganda Kingdom against other kingdoms.112 The 
contribution of the colonial practises in the construction of ethnicity should 
                                                          
107   As above 2. 
108   Mudoola (n 97 above) 12. 
109   Nabudere (n 88 above). 
110   SA Gakwandi (ed) ‘Uganda pocket facts: A companion guide to the country, its history,  
       culture, economy and politics’ (1999) 22.   
111   Fulgencio (n 6 above) 6.  
112   Nabudere (n 88 above). 
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thus not be under estimated as these practises gave rise to many of 
Uganda’s ethnic problems.  
 
3.3. Post colonial Era 
 
From independence in 1962, Uganda has had nine presidents. The first 
government under Sir Edward Mutesa II ended in 1966 when Apollo Milton 
Obote who was the prime minster assisted by the army overthrew the 1962 
independence constitutional arrangement and introduced the 1967 
republican Constitution. Obote was ousted by Idi Amin Dada who ruled 
Uganda with an iron hand until combined forces from Tanzania and Uganda 
forced him into exile in 1979.  Following this, Uganda was ruled by Yusuf 
Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Paulo Muwanga who rigged the elections and ushered 
in Milton Obote’s second rule. General Tito Okello Lutwa later overthrew 
Obote and was forced out of power by the Museveni led National Resistance 
Army (NRA) in 1986.  Scholars like Mazuri state that the upheavals in 
Uganda since independence were a result of ethnic tensions and ethnic 
diversities.113 While Kabwegere blamed it on British colonialism and the 
effects of the divide and rule policy that they perpetrated during 
colonialism.114 On a whole, it can be argued that both these factors have 
contributed to ethnisation of Uganda.  
 
At independence, the political parties were the Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC) the Democratic Party (DP) and Kabaka Yekka (KY). According to 
Karugire, the DP started with two fundamental mistakes. It was 
predominantly Buganda and Catholic in leadership. The UPC, on the other 
hand, was Protestant and sought to contain Buganda.115 The major 
resources of the ethnic groups were the block votes on which the political 
parties were to depend if they were to inherit the colonial mantle. The 
politics surrounding the election of president mainly involved ethnic groups 
and the ruling coalition UPC and KY. While the Buganda ruling group 
believed that their Kabaka should be president, the other ethnic groups 
                                                          
113   A Mazuri Soldiers and kinsmen in Uganda: The making of a military Ethnocracy (1975) 60. 
114   T Kabwegere The politics of state formation and destruction in Uganda (1995) 67. 
115   Karugire (n 101 above) 50. 
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opened up the candidature to include other ethnic leaders.116 The race 
seemed to be between the Kabaka of Buganda and the Kyabazinga (king) of 
the Basoga Sir William Nadiope but due to ethnic considerations and the 
fear of the Baganda, Mudoola reports that Obote did a lot of convincing in 
order for the Kabaka to be made President. Further, as a means of ethnic 
balancing, the post of vice president was created for the Kyabazinga.117 Thus 
with Mutesa as president,118 and Obote as prime minister, and with 
manipulations of ethnicity already at play, Uganda entered into her days as 
an independent state. 
 
3.3.1. Edward Mutesa II (1962- 1966) 
 
This regime started with a UPC-KY alliance. The major problems seemed to 
be boundary disputes like in the east of Bugisu, the Bamba and Bakonjo 
rebellion against the rule of the Batoro.  However, the most controversial was 
the lost counties to Bunyoro. When the matter of the lost counties came up, 
Obote adhered to the 1962 Constitution which clearly stated that in a case 
of a boundary conflict or people wanted to secede, a referendum would be 
conducted.119 Thus a referendum was held in 1964. The population of the 
two counties voted overwhelmingly for the return of the counties to the 
Bunyoro Kingdom. This democratic solution to the problem instead brought 
conflict between the Baganda and the Banyoro on the one hand and the 
central government and Buganda on the other hand.120  
 
This resulted in the breakup of the UPC-KY alliance that had been strong at 
independence. It also led to wide spread rioting in Buganda. The Baganda 
demanded for the removal of central government from their land and the 
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Kabaka started persuading people from the central government, parliament 
and opposition groups to join them in a mission of overthrowing Obote.121 
 
After this event, both leaders resorted to ethnic manipulation  with the army 
as the pawn, while Mutesa put his trust in the Iteso and Baganda in the 
army, Obote solicited support of high ranking Langi and Acholi officers and a 
few from west Nile led by Idi Amin.122 These upheavals made the army less 
national and more ethnic in character. The years 1964 to 1966 were 
turbulent and culminated into the 1966 Buganda crisis which took on an 
ethnic expression. 
 
3.3.2. Apollo Milton Obote (1966 to 1971) 
 
In 1966 while Mutesa was preparing to table an opposition motion 
denouncing Obote as corrupt, accusing him of plotting to overthrow his own 
government, filling the army with Acholi and Langi and of training a personal 
army, Obote had the army surround the parliament. With an army whose 
figures indicate that by 1963, 50% were drawn from Acholi and most of the 
remainder were from West Nile,123 Obote was ready to face Buganda and 
opposition from within the UPC. Obote then accused Mutesa of colluding 
with the Itesot to use the army to topple the government.  
 
On 26 February 1966, Obote organised a battalion under Idi Amin to storm 
the Kabaka’s palace in Lubiri which formed the 1966 Buganda crisis. 
Throughout this crisis, Buganda found itself surrounded by unsympathetic 
neighbours. Reactions from other ethnic leaders in Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole 
among others were supportive of Obote’s actions and indeed sent 
congratulatory messages to Obote for his brave actions.124 Buganda ceased 
to exist as a political sub entity and was divided into four divisions for the 
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purpose of the new administration.125 Obote’s concern was to weaken the 
organisational manifestation of ethnicity. He thus worked to strengthen the 
authority of the centre by enacting a series of regulations for local 
government creating a uniform system of regulations for local government 
between the centre and all districts.126 
 
Obote suspended the 1962 Constitution and Mutesa fled to Britain ushering 
in what is called the 1967 pigeonhole Constitution.127 Uganda then declared 
a republic, monarchies were abolished and the presidency with political 
powers of which Obote was the incumbent was established.128 He mostly 
persons from his own ethnic group to cabinet positions such as Felix kenyi 
Onama as defence minister, Erinayo Oryema inspector-general of police and 
Akena- Adoko head of intelligence.129  
His era was marked by ethnic manipulation largely against the Buganda.130 
By the outbreak of the 1966 crisis, Obote had in the military a reliable 
constituency, based on ethnicity. And until the military coup in 1971, 
Buganda remained in a state of emergency which rendered Obote more 
dependent on the ethnic based army for fear of upheavals.131  
 
3.3.3. Idi Amin Dada (1971 to 1979) 
 
Amin come to power in 1971 after ousting Obote. The Amin coup was a 
decisive reaction against polarisation in the military along ethnic lines.132 
Nsibambi argues that it was a product of Uganda’s political culture and was 
directly linked to the social cleavages that hindered Uganda’s national 
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128   Mudoola (n 97 above) 101. 
129   FT Odoi ‘ Politics, ethnicity and conflict in post independent Acholiland, Uganda 1962- 
       2006’ Unpublished PhD thesis University of Pretoria (2009) 143. 
130   As above 137. 
131   Fulugencio (n 6 above) 8. 
132   D  Mudoola (n 97 above) 131. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
integration.133  When Amin came into power, he promised that he would 
organise free and fair elections. He however, introduced an elder’s forum in 
which he began to condemn political parties and politicians and later 
promulgated a decree dissolving all district heads, declared all political 
parties illegal and declared himself life president.134  
 
Then like Obote, Amin used the army to further his political career. He 
constituted the army with West Nilers mostly Kakwa and Lugbara.135 He also 
gave his soldiers ‘blanket protection’ to undertake revenge killings in parts of 
Acholi and Lango on the grounds that these areas were Obote domain.136 
Witch hunting of Acholi soldiers continued to the different barracks.  
Uganda post-independence leadership now took on revenge against members 
of other ethnic groups. Amin’s massacre of Acholi and Langi led several of 
them to flee to neighbouring countries where they regrouped against his 
regime. His rule was characterised by torture, gross human rights abuses, 
killing against mostly the Acholi and Langi.137  Ethnicity perpetuated by 
militarism was now at in full force. 
 
3.3.4 Yusuf Lule to Tito Okello (1980 to 1985) 
 
After the fall of Amin the leaders took on a ‘winner takes all’ type of politics 
and struggle that plunged Uganda into a civil war between 1981 to1985. 
This was an extremely chaotic period in Uganda’s already bloody history. In 
this short period, Ugandans were subjected to five presidents and separate 
governments they included, Yusuf Lule,138 Binaisa,139 and Paulo 
Muwanga.140 This then led to the second Obote regime and Tito Okello 
Lutwa.  
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Each president during this era attempted to retain power at the expense of 
another ethnic group. For example, Lule, on taking over power, attempted to 
reorganise the army by implementing a quota system of enlistment where 
recruits from each ethnic group would be proportionate to the numerical 
strength of that group in the whole country.141 This would of course have led 
to a number of Baganda being enlisted, as they were the majority in the 
army, to counter the Acholi and Langi presence in the army. This did not 
work as all these governments exhibited weakness.  None of the 
governments had a firm hold on the police, the secret service or the army. 
The soldiers in Binasia, Obote and Okello governments often defied orders 
and behaved unprofessionally. More over none of the five governments after 
Amin was deposed were elected by the people of Uganda.142 
In 1980, the military commission finally arranged for general elections.143 
The main parties during these elections were the Obote-led UPC, DP, KY and 
Museveni’s Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The UPC was declared elected 
but the results were disputed by DP and UPM. Ethnicity came to the fore 
during these elections as most of the elected opposition members of 
parliament came from the southern part of the country. Nearly all members 
of parliament in Buganda were elected from a predominantly Buganda party 
DP. West Nile, being the region identified with the Amin regime which had 
been overthrown the year before, had no elections. The MPs from that region 
were declared unopposed and they were all members of Obotes UPC.144  
These disputed elections led Museveni into the bush after his UPM party 
won only one seat in parliament. The guerrilla war, which was fought on 
Buganda soil against the UPC government, was predominantly seen as a 
struggle between the north and south. Uganda’s politics degenerated further 
into ethnic backed conflicts. Museveni in an interview stated that the 
problem was from the north and that the Acholi had permeated all spheres 
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of Uganda’s public service with the southerners playing a periphery role 
since independence.145  
While Museveni was fighting the guerrilla war, Obote the newly elected 
president shifted the conflict to West Nile where the bulk of Amin’s army 
hailed from. Revenge massacres were committed in this region which 
manifested the level of ethnic polarisation and militarism in Uganda.146 
Obote thought that he could rely on the army and a divided ethnic Uganda 
to keep power as he had done in his first tenure. However he faced rebellion 
on several fronts. From the Museveni led UPM in the Luwero triangle, to one 
on West Nile in retaliation to the ethnic massacres by Obote in West Nile 
after Amin’s regime. The infighting within the ranks of Obote’s UPC and the 
Army led him to be deposed in 1985 by a once loyal Tito Okello. Tito Okello 
an Acholi president tired to bridge the ethnic divide by appointing Paulo 
Muwanga as prime minister. His rule was, however, short lived as despite 
calls for peace and power sharing arrangements with the rebel movements in 
the country, the Museveni-led group ousted him from power in 1986.  
 
3.3.5. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (1986 to 1995) 
 
When the Museveni came to power, he inherited the problems that 
bedevilled all the previous regimes. Museveni tried to restore calm into the 
country by outlining a ten point programme. These were intended to provide 
the basis for a nationwide coalition of political and social forces which could 
usher in a better future for the long-suffering people of Uganda. Specifically, 
he among others pledged the consolidation of national unity and the 
elimination of all forms of sectarianism.147 He also put in place particular 
programmes that were meant to manage the ethnic problems that had 
plagued the country since independence. These included the introduction of 
resistance councils country wide, reinstatement if cultural leaders and 
putting in place ministers for vulnerable groups. 
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Resistance councils  
 
One of the responses to the ethnic divisions that plagued the country was 
the formation of local Resistance Councils (RCs), which were named after the 
Resistance Movement that Museveni himself championed. These RCs grew 
out of the bush war beginnings in 1981. At that time, the RCs were informal 
networks of volunteers who assisted the NRA in their campaign, providing 
food, recruits and intelligence information for the guerrilla soldiers. Within a 
few years, the RCs came to act as de facto local governments, organising and 
providing services including policing and administration.148 The RC system 
was an opportunity for self governance by previously excluded ethnic 
groups.  
 
Reinstatement of cultural leaders 
 
Key in what Museveni felt at the time would manage the ‘ethnic question’ 
particularly in Buganda was the reinstatement of kingdoms in 1993, but 
without any political powers.149 This was a promise that Museveni has made 
to the Baganda while he fought against the Obote government. Thus, to the 
Baganda the reinstatement of their king whom they loved and had never 
forgotten was a major boast in their cultural identity. However, from his own 
ethnic group, Museveni discouraged the reinstatement of the cultural leader 
stating that the cultural institution is not popular in Ankole.150 
 
Special ministers for vulnerable groups 
 
Another initiative implemented by Museveni is the establishment of 
Ministries of State to deal with issues that are relevant to particular regions. 
They have been created in Luwero Triangle, Karamoja, and in several regions 
in the north of the country.  
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The first was established in 1991 to deal with the District of Luwero, which 
is located virtually in the centre of the country of Uganda. The Luwero 
Triangle, as it is often called, was the scene of some of the worst fighting, 
from 1980 to 1986. 151  The mission of the Department of Luwero Triangle 
was to administer the task of planning, coordinating and organising the 
social, economic and political rehabilitation and development in the war 
affected areas in the face of the after mirth of the  war. The second special 
regional Ministry of State related to the 18 districts in the north of Uganda to 
cater to the needs of the ethnic groups that were suffering at the hands of 
the rebellion of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA).152 
 
However, the ethnic problems have not been solved. The bitterness that is 
expressed in the north south divide which has deepened as Museveni has 
chosen a militaristic approach for ending the war in the north. There has 
also been increasingly unequal access to resources of Uganda’s economic 
success as trumpeted by the World Bank and the IMF.153 
 
3.3.6. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 1996 to date 
 
Despite Museveni’s original intentions, ethnicity has remained a significant 
problem in Uganda. One may even argue that due to the length of the 
regime, It is an effective tool used to exclude those of a different ethnic group 
in the competition for power and resources. Since it known that issues of 
ethnicity draw emotional responses, which are solidified by narratives and 
memories, its instrumentalisation is very effective.154 Ethnic tension have for 
one been manifested in the war with the Lord’s Resistance Army in the 
north.  
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Army 
 
The army which has played a significant role in Uganda’s politics since the 
rule of Obote also plays a significant role in Museveni’s government. The 
chief of staff of the army once noted that president Museveni’s county and 
not district has contributed 6000 officers and men to the UPDF. At the time, 
this was almost as many officers and men as the entire UPDF army of 6700. 
The Museveni’s brother major-general Salim Saleh at one point in time 
admitted that there is tribalism in the army stating that the system in the 
army is so clogged that there is no movement.155  
 
The NRM has also relied on ethnic identity for promoting army officers. 
Despite the criteria for promoting Army officers, Muhereza notes that the 
NRM is becoming an ethnic dictatorship because of the way in which certain 
minority ethnic army officers are promoted faster than others.  In 1996, of 
the 35 Army officers promoted and published in the press, 23 were from 
western Uganda.156 In the recent promotions among which was Museveni’s 
son to the post of full colonel, the bulk of the army officers that were 
promoted hailed from western Uganda.157 In this way, Museveni is ensuring 
the dominance of his ethnic group in the high ranks of the army and 
continuing the tradition of using the army as a force to protect the interests 
of political leaders. Today the army is constituted of the Banyankole and 
Bahima. All five generals are Banyankole.158 
 
War in Northern Uganda 
 
The success of the Museveni government in 1986 sparked off another civil 
war – the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. This war that 
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spanned a little over two decades was blamed in the beginning on the 
perception of the government towards the conflict. It was looked at as an 
Acholi war which perception caused untold suffering to the Acholi.159 A 
colonially constructed ethnic identity led to unjustified mistrust of 
northerners compounded by systematic underdevelopment of the area and 
prejudiced government agenda.160 The 1990s elections reflected this split 
with the north voting largely anti Museveni and the more populous south 
voting for the NRM. The split was exhibited in the continuing armed conflict 
in the North’s. Rebel groups in the north fought the NRM and its successor 
the UPDF since the NRM seized power in 1986.161 By mid-1996, there was 
an upsurge in fighting which led to the near isolation of the North West as 
the LRA cut off the road leading to the Nile crossing that links the north to 
the rest of the country. The LRA attacked the civilian population of Gulu and 
Kitgum mutilating and killing those who transgressed an ever growing series 
of commandments. 
 
Executive  
 
Cabinet appointments are measured by how many sons and daughters of 
the soil the president appoints to ministerial positions. Despite Uganda 
having third largest cabinet in the world, it does not reflect an attempt to 
include most ethnic groups. Rather it shows the attempt to consolidate 
support among those ethnic regions that support the ruling party.162 Of the 
over seventy ministers, the bulk of them come from western and central 
Uganda areas where Museveni is seeking patronage to stay in power.163  
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This particular distribution of patronage is no accident. After coming to 
power, Museveni needed to demonstrate that his was an inclusive, coalition 
government, not one run exclusively by his small circle of his kith and kin. 
Had he given top positions exclusively to his fellow westerners, he would 
have isolated himself and become vulnerable to attempts to grab power by 
those groups who were marginalised. The potential threat from Buganda was 
particularly strong. As the largest ethnic group in Uganda and one located at 
the political and financial heart of the country, the Baganda were not a 
group Museveni could afford to exclude. As a token of goodwill, he appointed 
Baganda to some of the top government positions like the position of vice 
president.  
Still, his coalition government did not need to be all-inclusive. Northerners 
were conspicuously underrepresented or absent altogether from top 
government positions and easterners were similarly scarce. 164  It was 
relatively easy to build a coalition of those from the west and center. After 
decades of tumultuous rule by northern-led governments, uniting the south 
with the implicit threat of northern domination, came easily. The fortification 
of the west-center coalition, and the north’s exclusion was aided by civil 
unrest in northern Uganda.165 Museveni’s cabinet to-date still shows a 
predominance of people from western and central Uganda with many of the 
positions for the north and the east being mainly ministers of state and not 
full ministers.166 It is also interesting to note that Museveni’s wife holds the 
position of special minister of state for Karamoja while his brother was a 
former minister of state for micro finance.  
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Creation of new districts 
 
Museveni has manipulated ethnic identities in almost every district of 
Uganda. For electoral purposes, Museveni has been engaging himself in 
creating new districts by splitting existing districts. These new creations 
have followed ethnic or sub-ethnic lines.167 For more political than 
development gains, Museveni promised the creation of districts in several 
areas. Most of these developmentally non-viable districts are created along 
ethnic demarcations, hence further entrenching inter-ethnic divisions.168 For 
example, in districts of Tororo where the Japadhola and the Itesot existed 
and worked together, the issue of separate districts arose as a consequence 
of the politicking of both the local political elites from both these 
communities and Museveni’s wish to win the favour of both these 
communities. This he did by agreeing to the creation of three districts at 
Kisoko, Mukuju and Tororo County out of the present district. Instead of 
encouraging the two communities to continue to work together, the 
President succumbed to the local ethnic pressures exploited by the local 
political elites to win jobs for themselves.169  
 
Another example being in Kibaale, one of the ethnically tense districts in 
Uganda, the native Banyoro have been in violent opposition to leadership by 
non-Banyoro in their local government since 2002. The argument is over 
whether the Banyoro should exclusively occupy all top positions in the area 
since the area historically belongs to them.170 Muhereza and Otim note that 
the government created the new district of Nakasongola from Luwero in 
order to curb the powers of Buganda to demand for federal. They note that 
by creating this district that is dominated by the Baruli this curtailed the 
power of the Buganda monarchy to form a united front against the central 
government as it is very unlikely that that the new districts that were part of 
the lost counties would agree to join the Buganda.171 
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3.4. Conclusion 
 
The divisions within Uganda are enormous. But the greatest division in 
Uganda appears to be ethnic related differences. It is on this basis that the 
extreme violence that has been carried out since colonial times. To many 
ethnic groups, the independent state is an instrument for the advancement 
of their own interests. While the NRM leadership is characterised by peace 
and prosperity in the south, the North has seen two decades of rebellion that 
has claimed tens of thousands of lives and for several years forced over 1.5 
million people into internally displaced camps.172  
 
Museveni, established initiatives and programs to address the ethnic 
problems. Yet they do not seem to be particularly effective. Certainly, the 
implementation the complex system of Resistance Councils has been 
disappointing. The reinstatement of the kingdoms of Uganda and the 
convocation of the three special regional Ministries of State have been only 
moderately successful and ethnic conflict in Uganda continues. The 
agitation for federalism from both the Baganda and Acholi can therefore be 
seen as a search for a new identity particularly with the perceived failure of 
national identity.  
Since the advent of the NRM, several socio-political formations have been 
unfolding. Mamdani once described the Museveni government, as a broad 
based government which did not go beyond the Nile to the East and beyond 
Karuma to the North.173 According to this view, the Museveni government is 
predominantly seen as a southern government.174 Uganda thus needs to put 
in place a system that would encourage a more ethnically inclusive state. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DECENTRALISATION AND ETHNICITY IN UGANDA 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether the policy of decentralisation 
in Uganda has addressed ethnic differences. The chapter will start by 
reflecting on decentralisation from colonialism to date. It will be argued that 
while the political, financial and administrative decentralisation have to 
some extent accommodated ethnic diversity, the loopholes in the 
implementation of the policy are causing one of the most advanced 
decentralisation policies in Africa to fail to accommodate ethnic diversity.  
Uganda is one of the several countries in the world pursuing the policy of 
decentralisation. In fact it has one of the most ambitious and radical 
decentralisation policies in Sub Saharan Africa. Building upon a long 
tradition of local government structures in Uganda, the presidential policy 
statements of 1992 formalised and articulated the government’s political 
commitment to decentralisation.175 This commitment was strengthened and 
maintained through the provision of the Constitution which clearly spells 
out that the state is to be guided by the principles of decentralisation, and 
the devolution of government powers and functions.176 Accordingly, it has 
been designed to devolve powers and responsibilities for administration, 
planning and finance to the local levels where people can also participate in 
the decision making. This was a reversal of the centralist tendencies that 
had been introduced by the Local Administration Act of 1967, under which 
local administrations were tightly controlled by the centre.177 
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4.2. Decentralisation during colonialism  
The decentralised system of governance is Uganda goes back as far as the 
colonial administration times. The colonial ruler’s divided Uganda into four 
provinces, namely north, east, west and the Kingdom of Buganda. Each 
province was further divided into sixteen districts created along ethnic lines 
and ruled through ‘traditional’ leadership.178 The districts were important in 
the subsequent formation of ethnic identity and new districts were very 
rarely created, and then only for explicitly administrative purposes.179 
 
In order to rule over the created districts, the British adopted a system of 
indirect rule by which indigenous leaders were used to serve as colonial 
junior functionaries.180 The British replicated throughout most of the 
country a Buganda form of administration which consisted of a hierarchy of 
chiefs in a descending order of seniority and importance: respectively the 
county chief, the sub-county chief, and the parish chief.181 The traditional 
leaders were neither elected nor were they accountable to the local 
population but rather to their colonial administrators.182 Backed by the 
power of the colonial government in the guise of the District Commissioner, 
the chief’s powers of arrest and seizure, and control over allocation and use 
of property was nearly unlimited.183  
 
This system continued until 1947 when the colonial secretary announced a 
new policy converting the indirect rule into a democratic, efficient and 
modern system of local governance. This led to the Local Government 
Ordinance of 1949184 which was the first formal recognition of the district as 
the basic unit of the local government in the protectorate. With the creation 
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of ethnic based districts, this Ordinance in large meant that the legal 
enactment formalised the introduction of ethnic local government councils in 
Uganda.185 In order to institute further reforms of democracy in the local 
government, the British passed the 1955 District Councils Ordinance. This 
Ordinance provided for the election of the majority of the district council 
members with a measure of autonomy and control over local budgets and 
taxation subject of course to approval by the protectorate government. The 
Ordinance also provided that chiefs would be appointed by a district 
appointments board and this same board would be responsible for the 
discipline and control of chiefs. There was however excessive partisan 
interference by local politicians in the appointment of chiefs, making it 
impossible for chiefs to discharge their duties.186  
 
Thus, it became necessary for the 1955 Ordinance to be amended in order to 
shield the chiefs from political pressure and to turn them into civil servants 
of their councils. Thus, the District Councils (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 
was enacted.  Under this, an appointments board was to be instituted in 
each district and kingdom except Buganda and the members of those boards 
were appointed by the governor.187 The system cemented political and ethnic 
divisions in the country as there was not a uniform system of local 
government in Uganda. Buganda remained the only provincial government 
with local autonomy based on her 1900 agreement with the British.188 This 
system operated until independence. 
 
4.3.  Decentralisation 1962 to 1985 
At independence, the Constitution maintained the local government system 
developed during colonialism. It however established a fairly decentralised 
system combining federalism, semi-federalism and a unitary State. It 
granted a federal status to the Kingdom of Buganda and a semi-federal 
status to the Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, and the territory of 
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Busoga. It also provided for councils to be established in the districts of 
Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West 
Nile.189 Districts as well as urban local governments were granted powers 
over their local matters.  
Local governments comprised largely of elected councils.190 However, the 
local government elections were organised around political parties. 
Candidates vying to be councillors stood on the tickets of political parties. 
They were elections by and for state officials. The basic Electoral College was 
the parish council, which was constituted, not of the population of the 
parish, but of non-elected government chiefs. These chiefs elected chiefs to 
serve on the county councils, whose members in turn elected from among 
themselves councillors who sat on the district council. Since these elections 
were not based on universal suffrage, they did not constitute a mechanism 
for participation or accountability. On the contrary, they cemented top-down 
control over the population.191 The decentralised local government had the 
power to raise revenue through taxes, draw up and implement budgets and 
provide services.192 
 
The Obote rule, which sought to curtail the powers of Buganda, diminished 
the powers of local government significantly in the 1967 Constitution. The 
federal and semi federal kingdoms were sub-divided into districts and they 
had the same relationship with the central government as other districts.193 
The Constitution set up a highly centralised system of government which 
was operationalised by the Local Administration Act of 1967.194 Under this 
Constitution and local governments act, all local government officials were to 
                                                          
189   E Mugabi ‘Uganda’s Decentralisation Policy, Legal Framework, Local Government  
       Structure and Service Delivery’ (2004)    
       http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN031014.pdf  
       (accessed 19 September 2011). 
190   S Makara ‘Decentralisation and urban governance in Uganda’ Unpublished PhD thesis,  
       University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (2009) 24. 
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194   A Nsibambi (ed) Decentralisation and civil society in Uganda: The quest for good  
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be appointed by the government. It also made local governments increasingly 
dependent on the central government for financing as the central 
government controlled most of the sources of revenue. Local government 
budget, by laws and the convening of meetings had to be approved by the 
minister of local government.195  
 
This situation continued until 1971 when Amin ousted Obote from power. 
Amin dissolved districts and abolished local governments and urban 
administrations.196  He then established provincial administrations led by 
governors, most of whom were high-ranking military officials who ruled by 
decree.197 Amin also used village security council’s which were mainly 
administrative and security organs of state at the local level. Beke equates 
this security council system to Resistance Council system that Museveni 
later promulgated.198 However, these systems were not at the will of the 
masses but rather were imposed on them by from above.  
 
The ousting of Amin in 1979 led to the brief regimes of Yusuf Lule, Godfrey 
Binaisa and Paul Muwanga respectively. During these regimes, a local 
administrative system Mayumba Kumi (ten house cells) was established at 
the village level. They consisted of a chairman, a treasurer and a secretary. 
They were meant to mobilise the community to participate in self help 
activities. They, however, did not accomplish this task and were often used 
as rallies to listen to central government directives.199  The second Obote 
government did not make any significant efforts to re-establish decentralised 
governance. Obote in fact continued with his 1967 policy. This situation 
remained under the Tito Okello regime rule which was too short lived to 
                                                          
195   Makara (n 190 above) 7. 
196   By Legal Notice 1 of 1971. 
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       327. 
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accomplish any changes until the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
captured state power in 1986.200 
 
4.4. From Resistance Council to Local Council 
While the National Resistance Army (NRA) was fighting against the Obote 
government in the 1980s, they established secret committees of volunteers 
who banded together primarily to mobilise food, recruits and intelligence 
information to fight the guerrilla war. By 1982, areas in which the NRM had 
gained control, these secret committees were formalised into local Resistance 
Councils (RCs) whose duties extended to controlling crime and general 
administration in their jurisdictions.201  
The RC system was a five tier hierarchical structure of councils: the grass 
roots RC1 was at the village level, RC 2 parish, RC 3 sub-county, RC county 
and RC 5 district.202 The new councils acquired the responsibility for local 
government and the administration of justice at the local level. This RC 
system played a big role in the expression by ordinary people of discontent 
towards the former elitist and distant actors in civil and political society who 
were considered responsible for the greater deterioration.203 The system gave 
an opportunity for previously excluded communities to have an opportunity 
to participate and chose who governs them. 
 
When the NRM took power in 1986, the 1987 Resistance Councils Statute 
laid the foundation for the decentralisation of authority to the people 
through their councils.204 It legalised RCs and gave them powers in their 
areas of jurisdiction at the local level.205 The RC1 was the most important in 
                                                          
200   Bazaara (n 182 above) 8. 
201   Museveni (n 147 above) 189.  
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everybody’s life. It was the village council, and every adult resident of this 
basic public administrative unit could become a councillor, regardless of 
their nationality. An Australian citizen could become an RC1 chairman in 
Koboko or Kisoro if the residents so wanted.206 The nine member executive of 
the RC1 constituted the council of the RC2, which corresponded with the 
parish, together with the executives of other RC1s in the parish. Similarly, 
the executive elected at RC2 constituted the council of the next level, RC3 
which corresponded to the sub-county.207 Thereafter, the government 
embarked on an effective implementation program of decentralisation with 
the enactment of the 1993 Resistance Council Statute.208  
 
The legal and political structure of the RCs was uniform throughout the 
country but the RCs tended to mean different things in different parts of the 
country. In some parts of the country the role was policy making within the 
framework of the NRM. In other parts it was the struggle against the state, 
the army, police, and court. The difference can largely be explained by 
geographical variation in the popularity of the NRM and the political forces 
and ethnic influences operating in the regions.209 
 
4.5. Decentralisation 1995 to date 
The decentralisation policy was later enshrined in Uganda’s constitution in 
1995 and was legalised by the Local Government Act (LGA) of 1997. It 
devolves substantial powers, functions and responsibilities to the local 
government, defines the structure of local government and specifies the 
respective responsibilities and powers of the local government as well as 
those of the central government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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       /index.html(accessed September 19 2011). 
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The LGA also established local councils (LCs) at the district (LCV), municipal 
(LC IV), and sub-county, division or town council (LCIII) levels as corporate 
bodies of local governments. The LGA devolved to these council’s far-
reaching powers and responsibilities in such areas as finance, legislation, 
politics, planning, and personnel matters. Local governments are now 
responsible for the bulk of administrative and political processes within their 
territories.210 Hence, decentralisation in Uganda is based on three 
interlinked aspects; political empowerment of the people, fiscal devolution, 
and control of the administrative machinery by the local councils which will 
be the subject of this discussion below. 
 
4.5.1. Political decentralisation 
The constitutionally enshrined political decentralisation in Uganda has been 
a gradual process with the central government retaining responsibility for 
national security, planning, immigration, foreign affairs and national 
projects. All other functions were devolved to local institutions. They include 
health, education, transport, agriculture and communication. One of the 
reforms instituted by the government is the principle of non-subordination, 
which implies the power of lower councils to make decisions on matters 
affecting them without resorting to higher levels of local government.211  
Election of local leaders 
The vertical decentralisation in Uganda’s local governance can be seen in the 
election process at the local government level. The members of the council 
which is the political organ at all local level are elected in regular elections. 
Councillors either represent specific electoral areas or interest groups, 
namely women, youth or disabled persons.212 Officials are recruited locally 
which gives non dominant ethnic groups that are excluded at the national 
level, a chance to elect persons from their own ethnic group into office 
without having to compete with the dominant ethnic group for the scarce 
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political positions. Further, the mandate of the councillors who serve for five 
year term213 can only be revoked by the electorate.214 This crystallises the 
power of non dominant ethnic group at the local government level. 
Further, elections under this system are based on ‘individual merit’ rather 
than political party affiliations. Councillors are elected by secret ballot on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage. This electoral system provides for 
downward accountability and the possibility of recall. Thus, the present 
system allows for a higher degree of participation in local government than 
any previous system in Uganda.215 It allows for ethnic groups to participate 
in the election of their local representatives. The non dominant ethnic 
groups can hold their elected representatives accountable and be part of the 
political process. However, it has been found that the NRM and the 
presidency tend to interfere directly in local council elections216 by using the 
police and the army and other paramilitary organs for dirty electioneering 
such as beatings, ballot stuffing and intimidation.217 Further, Local elections 
are usually decided on the basis of personal, tribal and party political 
loyalties.218 It is noteworthy that in the elected councils, there are reserved 
seats for women, youth and for minorities but the wording minorities 
however refers to handicapped and not ethnic minorities.219 
 
4.5.2. Fiscal decentralisation    
Fiscal decentralisation in Uganda is expected to facilitate access to resources 
by the local governments. Local governments get funds from the central 
government in three ways; conditional, unconditional, and equalisation 
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grants.220 Conditional grants are funds delegated by the central government 
to local governments for specific purposes. Unconditional grants, also called 
block grants, are for unspecified purposes. Equalisation grants are allocated 
to disadvantaged local governments that fare below the national average.221  
 
The provision, management of primary healthcare, primary education, roads, 
and basic urban services were decentralised to districts. In spite of 
decentralisation, however, some important decisions and responsibilities 
remained with the central government for example, in health, staffing 
decisions are made at the district level. In education, the curriculum and 
most funding come largely from the centre but decisions about personnel 
and school construction and operational maintenance are made locally.222  
 
Unconditional Grants 
The Constitution and section 81 (1) of the LGA have created a vertical 
system by which funds from the consolidated fund flow to local governments 
in the form of unconditional and conditional equalisation grants. 
Unconditional grants are the minimum grant that shall be paid to the local 
governments to run the decentralised services.223 Unconditional grants cover 
salaries, wages and discretionary expenditure by the district government. 
The criteria for allocating unconditional grants are restricted to the 
population and size of the district.224 Unconditional grants also called block 
grants are for unspecified purposes and constitute 11% of the government 
transfers to the local government. 225 
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Conditional grants  
This constitutes a bulk of the fund transferred to the local governments for 
specified purposes. This fund constitutes about 88% of central government 
funding.226 The conditionalities attached to these funds leave little discretion 
to local governments resulting in local governments having little involvement 
in planning and delivery of services in their areas.227 Three quarters of these 
funds take the form of conditional grants to districts principally in the 
health, education water, roads, and agriculture sectors.228 
There is no discretion available to the district to effect reallocation in line 
with its own priorities which undermines the local ownership of 
programmes.229 It can be argued that this keeps the central government in 
control of the local authorities by using conditional grants to influence and 
narrow down choice and political space for local authorities by attaching 
strong conditions and supervising procedures on the use of grants. The 
centre ensures that its programmes are lucrative and viable.230  
 
Equalisation grant 
Section 84(4) of the LGA stipulates that local governments lagging behind 
the national average in service delivery be given an equalisation grant to 
even out the differences in service delivery.  Although it sometimes doesn’t 
seem to narrow the income gap between regions as rich local governments 
such as Kampala become richer while power ones like Kalangala stay poor. 
Rich well placed and, educated politicians continue to dominate the local 
politics while the poor and marginalised play a peripheral role.231   
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Raising revenue 
The independence of local governments should have been guaranteed 
through raising of their own revenue. The Constitution specifically empowers 
local governments to mobilise and generate local revenues.232 It gives 
extensive powers to districts to generate local revenue through taxes and 
autonomy to govern its distribution. 233 These taxes include rents, rates, 
royalties, stamp duties, cess, fees on registration and licensing and taxes 
that parliament may prescribe.234 Locally raised revenues include produce 
taxes, market dues, licences and district specific taxes.235 Local governments 
have some discretion in setting tax rates but only after consulting with 
Ministry of Local Government or the Parliament.236  
 
Annual license fees are payable by a wide range of trades and businesses. In 
addition to market dues, parish taxes are payable on all transactions and 
businesses at the village level. Permits are required for the movement of 
livestock.237 However, the level of revenues raised is constrained by a weak 
revenue base and the inevitable political costs of imposing local taxes. 
Reflecting these constraints, levels of local revenue are, in real terms, static 
or in many districts falling. Analysis of the budgets of the three research 
districts showed that the proportion of revenue raised from local sources was 
small: 5% in Mbale, 4% in Kamuli and 10% in Mubende. Centrally allocated 
funds, accounting, as a national average, for 90% of income, therefore 
dominate district finances. It is this combination of centrally originating 
conditional grants and limited local resources which gives decentralisation 
in rural Uganda its specific and contradictory character.238 
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The central government retains the buoyant sources of revenue like the 
value added tax (VAT), income tax, customs and excise duties, leaving local 
governments depending largely on graduated tax which has also been 
abolished. 239 Graduated tax was the most significant source of revenue 
among these and was payable annually by all adult males and salaried 
females according to a scale based on imputed incomes, which take into 
account ownership of productive assets.240 The abolition of graduated tax 
implies that local governments, especially the rural ones, will now solely 
depend of central government transfers. This will greatly undermine the 
autonomy of local governments because their operations will largely be 
regulated by the centre, as they cannot generate local revenue.241  
 
Further, the allocation of expenditure responsibilities among local 
government tiers favours upward accountability where higher levels of 
government retain significant expenditures but can delegate some of their 
responsibilities to lower level institutions. In contrast, local governments are 
entrusted with expenditures related to staff remuneration. Local authorities 
are also responsible for undertaking expenses related to service delivery 
financed through conditional grants. These funds are channelled through 
the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) which leaves little scope for the government to 
undertake non-stipulated but essential works.242 
 
Some local authorities have attempted to enhance their independence by 
finding alternative sources and forums for organised action against the 
centre. They have therefore set up associations to counterbalance the power 
of the centre and maximise their plan to get a political advantage.243 Even 
though the local authorities have tried to raise external funds, in order to 
deal with outside authorities, they have to be cleared by the ministry of 
foreign affairs. The centre imposes conditions, control rules and regulations 
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that ensure that local authorities comply with the needs and wishes of the 
central government.  
Further, the discovery of oil in the country raises huge challenges for the 
country and the local governments in particular. The oil contracts are 
shrouded in secrecy and allegations of corruption are rampant. In Amuru 
district, one of the districts in which oil has been discovered, the district 
officials claim that the read about the prospecting of the oil in the district in 
the papers and are not consulted. The local residents also state that the oil 
companies employ people from outside of their districts to carry out even the 
casual labour.244 In Bunyoro kingdom where oil exploration has began, the 
kingdom officials are complaining that the natural oil and gas policy left out 
the kingdom as one of the rightful beneficiaries of the oil wealth. The local 
government on the other hand complains that the development activities of 
the oil company are done without the knowledge of the local government.245 
There needs to be a review of the revenue sharing arrangements with 
districts to make them realistic and sustainable.246 Further still, there has 
been a policy by the president to give away land in districts without 
consulting local government authorities. There have been clashes with the 
president over giving away land in Mukono and Amuru district for sugarcane 
cultivation.247          
The most important part of decentralisation which is financial is not felt by 
the Ethnic groups residing in these districts. The strong arm of the 
government is felt through the conditional grants that are given to these 
local government units and the people in these areas may not feel like they 
are governing themselves.  Districts do not have sufficient financial 
resources to run decentralised and delegated functions due to a narrow tax 
base. 
The central government has tended to monopolise the sources of revenue 
like the sales tax while leaving the non elastic sources like market dues to 
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local authorities. The collected revenue between the centre and the local 
authorities should be shared equitably. Most of the sources of revenue for 
local governments are not as buoyant as VAT. Worse still local authorities 
are poor at collecting these taxes and added to corruption, these taxes 
collected do not give much to local governments.248 
 
4.5.3. Administrative decentralisation 
The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)249 is the head of the service in the 
district and the accounting officer.250 The CAO is thus in charge of managing 
the district. In order to ensure that the local governments have 
independence, the Constitution ensures that they are in charge of 
accountability. The CAO is answerable to the district council which is the 
supreme political organ in the district and the district chairperson as the 
district political head.  
The district council is also the legislative arm of the local government while 
the district executive committee and the local public service comprise the 
executive arm of local government. The civil servants are headed by the CAO 
who is an employee of the district council. The districts are linked to the 
central government through the Ministry of Local Government and the Local 
Government Finance Commission (LGFC).251 Despite this, the local 
governments have sufficient authority to deal with public affairs in their 
respective jurisdictions.252 Decentralisation has been seen in a number of 
services and functions transferred from the centre to local governments. 
These include powers to legislate powers at different levels.253 The laws made 
by local governments must be consistent with other laws in place and with 
the constitution. This ensures harmony between the laws made by the 
district LG and the existing laws and central government policies.254   
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One of the major achievements of the decentralisation is the devolution of 
civil service to the district councils. The district councils now recruit, 
remunerate, discipline and fire their own staff. These functions are vested in 
the District Service Commission (DSC) which is responsible to the councils. 
The DSCs were established not only to enable local governments recruit, 
discipline and dismiss local government employees expeditiously but also 
enhance their autonomous decision making.255 The tendency is to employ 
only persons from the recruiting district. This allows for ethnic minorities to 
find employment in the civil service and close to their homes. This has bred 
what is locally known as the ‘son of the soil syndrome.’256  However, in the 
local council elections, one of the campaign chips in some areas rotates 
around eliminating foreigners and giving jobs to ‘sons of the soil.’ If this kind 
of localised discourse is allowed to flourish there is danger that 
decentralisation will end up marginalising people and communities perceived 
as non-native in the specific district.257 People tend to apply for jobs in their 
home districts. Candidates from the Bantu south have shown less and less 
interest for jobs in the north and north east. If this trend continues, this 
would lead to self-sustaining tendency for broad ethnic cleavages to 
dominate local public services in each region.258 
 
Creation of new districts 
There are now 111 districts in Uganda259 up from 33 in 1986 when the NRM 
came into power in 1986. An overview of the administrative structure related 
to the ethnic composition of Uganda today shows that almost no district is 
mono-ethnic. This internal multi-ethnicity is often seen as a reason for 
conflicts. A frequent response to these conflicts has been to split up districts. 
The danger is that this process is leading to fragmentation, resulting in 
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areas, too small to administer efficiently in particular areas too small to 
guarantee the presence of viable administrative infrastructure and of 
competent authorities. 260  
 
Demarcation of boundaries is an important component of a visible process of 
devolution of power. It is a process through which local needs are 
identifiable in a sustainable and non-conflictual manner.261 In other words, 
decentralisation seems to have opened up the space for expression of rights 
of identity and belonging. Ethnic communities in districts who felt 
marginalised have therefore increased demands for the creation of more 
districts that will give them a native home with full political rights and some 
element of territorial autonomy. For example, in 1996 the government 
created the new district of Nakasongola which was curved out of Luwero. 
Historically, Nakasongola is part of the ‘lost counties.’262 This land is 
inhabited by the Baruli. The Baruli alleged that they were marginalised by 
the Baganda in Luwero and demanded a district of their own. This was 
granted to them and this limited the extent of the Buganda monarchy to 
form a united front against the central government.  
 
Minorities within minorities 
 
Feelings of marginalisation have become apparent in districts with a 
particularly identifiable concentration of immigrants. In Mbale district, 
parish people feel that they are culturally and politically dominated, and 
would like to be transferred to the neighbouring district of Sironko.263 The 
Bakilayi are said to be marginalised in terms of social services as well as 
dominated culturally and politically by their counterparts in the sub-county, 
the Bafumbo. The Kilayi claim to have been denied access to forest resources 
formerly utilised for economic and cultural activities and to have been 
subjected to frequent cruel attacks in the name of law enforcement.  
                                                          
260   Beke (n 21 above) 153.  
261   D Singiza ‘Chewing more than you can swallow: A commentary on the creation of new  
       districts in Uganda. Some compelling considerations’ (2011) 2. 
262   See footnote 94 
263   Sironko is a new district created out of Mbale. 
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Sentiments such as the above have now found expression in the crave for 
new districts or transfer to preferred neighbouring districts. It has been, 
however, noted that the creation of a district has a multiplier effect and each 
district created results into new demands from local communities who feel 
marginalised. The notion of territoriality and homogeneity embedded within 
the logic of decentralisation in Uganda creates an unending chain of 
marginalisation and quest for autonomy. Even within seemingly 
homogeneous communities issues still arise in terms of what dialect of the 
language is dominant is official discourse or even what clans are dominating 
powerful positions in the district.  
 
Criticisms by certain local minorities that their political rights are being 
abrogated under the existing district structures have led to the formation of 
new districts and the reconfiguration of others to mirror better the ethnic 
composition of local geographic areas. While well-intentioned, the effect has 
been to accentuate ethnic differences, slow integration, and overlay a 
political matrix onto the existing ethnic boundaries. From a national 
perspective, son of the soil laws reduce incentives for group integration and 
limit opportunities for the most talented staff to advance. Finally, certain 
ethnic groups remain unsatisfied with the decentralisation framework and 
continue to agitate for some form of federal autonomy as an alternative. The 
Buganda (comprising 25% of population, historically privileged, and 
maintaining a recognized king) are the most vocal 49 proponents of a federal 
structure. Their vision is the restoration of the king as executive, control 
over fiscal policy, and territorial autonomy for the Buganda kingdom (which 
comprises the capital in Kampala). If successful, other former kingdoms 
would follow suit.264 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The decentralisation system in Uganda although it was not intended to 
accommodate diversity has in some cases been used as a tool for settling 
ethnic diversity often where there have been two or more competing ethnic 
groups. However, this has not produced viable result with some writers often 
                                                          
264   J Siegle & P O’Mahony ‘Assessing the merits of decentralisation as a conflict mitigation 
strategy’ 
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arguing that it has actually exacerbated both intrastate and interstate 
conflict. However, this could be attributed to the way the system has been 
handled by the central government. Resources remain meagre, and transfers 
from central government are low and increasingly tied to conditions, leaving 
little room for local discretion. Additionally, broader reforms are necessary to 
achieve effective participation by ethnic groups without interference from the 
centre.265  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
265    R Work ‘Federalism: The future of decentralising states?’ (2002) 13. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary and conclusion 
This study set out to investigate the efficacy of the decentralised system of 
governance in accommodating ethnic diversity in Uganda. The investigation 
on ethnicity in Uganda revealed that the concept of ethnicity was created 
during the colonial period. The colonial rulers using policies of divide and 
rule, drawing of boundaries, as well as favouring some ethnic groups over 
others, created rigid ethnic identities in Uganda. Further, that the post-
colonial governments further entrenched that ethnic divide in the country 
leading to conflict, great economic disparities in the regions and the 
domination by the ethnic group that held power.  
The study also found that the system of decentralisation in some cases 
manages to accommodate ethnic groups. It, for example, gives ethnic 
minorities in territories where they form the majority, the opportunity to 
elect and hold leaders accountable. The study also revealed that the 
decentralisation policy allowed for ethnic groups to obtain employment in 
the civil service at the district level. This form of decentralisation 
accommodates ethnic diversity and creates a sense of inclusion. 
However, the study found that while Uganda’s ambitious decentralisation 
policy may have devolved political powers to the local governments, the 
interference by the central government into the affairs of the local 
government’s waters down the constitutionally entrenched policy. It revealed 
that the lack of a strong fiscal policy to guarantee ethnic minorities the 
power to raise their own revenues takes away the autonomy from the local 
government. The failure to raise revenue may lead to a recentralisation of 
powers as local governments depend heavily on resources from the central 
government to function. Lastly, the decentralisation of powers to control who 
works at the local governments is commendable as it gives ethnic minorities 
jobs that would have otherwise been taken by the dominant ethnic group. 
This needs to take into account the fact that local government units can 
never truly be ethnically homogenous and thus should avoid a 
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recentralisation of power at the local government level through the 
domination by the ethnic majority in that district.  
In conclusion, if stronger decentralisation is actually practiced in Uganda, it 
can be a strong tool in managing the ethnic diversity in the country. 
However, as no district is mono-ethnic, new designs should be used to make 
local governments and administrations more inclusive of all ethnic groups in 
the districts. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Political decentralisation 
It has already been noted that Uganda cannot achieve a purely mono-ethnic 
district. However, the implementation of the current decentralisation policy 
allows for the re-centralisation of power at the district level by the majority 
ethnic group. This recreates the feeling of exclusion of the minorities residing 
in these districts leading to conflict and demands for new districts. In order 
to address the problem of the recentralisation of powers at the local 
government level, local minorities need to be represented at every level in the 
local councils. The local governments can use the constitutional clause of 
the representation of the minorities to include ethnic minorities. The 
government should do this by reading Article 180(2) (C) of the constitution to 
include not only women and people with disabilities but also ethnic 
minorities. Thus like women and the disabled who have special seats at the 
local government level, ethnic minorities within these districts can also have 
special seats reserved for them. 
5.2.2 Fiscal decentralisation 
 
The central government needs to consult together with the local government 
on other possible sources of revenue for the local governments. The central 
government should start by ensuring that local governments in districts 
where oil has been discovered are consulted. The resources coming from the 
oil exploration can ensure the independence of the local governments in the 
districts in which it being explored. A stronger system for the equalisation 
grant would also ensure that the poorer districts would develop.  
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5.2.3 Administrative decentralisation 
While the creation of new districts may be good for ethnic minorities as it 
ensures territorial autonomy, the number of districts on the country is 
alarming. Not only are these districts not economically viable, but they 
create isolation for ethnic groups that maybe a threat to nationalism. 
Uganda could thus learn from Kenya that has under their new constitution 
reduced on the number of ethnic-based districts as the previous ones were a 
source of inter-ethnic conflict. The central government can create larger 
districts which incorporate more than one ethnic group. The central 
government just needs to ensure that the design used accommodates all 
ethnic groups that are found in that district. 
It should be noted that the ethnic question cannot be answered only at the 
local government level mostly when it is apparent that the state at central 
level is ethnically biased. Thus, here also needs to be more ethnic 
accommodation even at the central government level as decentralisation is 
just one tool in managing the ethnic question. Peace in Uganda therefore, 
has to tread a balance of accommodating ethnicity at the local government 
level but at the same time build the nation.  The route is not to approach the 
question through as ethnic lense, but to create an inclusive government and 
administration at local as well as national level. 
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